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European (EU) economic integration has always
involved a commitment to the free movement of
labour, services and capital. However, the
development by EU institutions of speciﬁc rights
with respect to labour mobility has been slow.
This paper explores this issue from the
perspective of pension rights, among the most
long-lasting for citizens. It shows that the
literature on this topic has focussedmainly on EU
regulations, their scope and limitations. The
paper argues that, although important, this work
has led to the neglect of a more fundamental
issue: the potential impact on mobility of the
relative generosity of pension schemes and large
national wealth variations, an increasingly
salient issue since the expansion of the EU into
Eastern andCentral Europe. Thus, on the basis of
a detailed review of dominant intra-EU
migratory patterns, the paper investigates the
impact on pension rights of movement between
Beveridgean and Bismarckian pension systems
and between countries of substantially different
wealth. It shows that lower income workers who
move from Beveridgean to Bismarckian
countrieswould bemost at risk of pension losses.
However, such movement is unusual; instead,
the majority of intra-EU migrants move from
Bismarckian systems of low generosity in the
poorer east to Beveridgean and more generous
Bismarckian in the richer west. Workers who
make this move are more likely to experience
pension gains than losses. For them, free
movement is achieved. Copyright © 2013 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.*Correspondence to: Traute Meyer, Social Sciences, Faculty of
Social and Human Sciences, University of Southampton,
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pension system‘TheCommunity shall have as its task, byestablishing a common market and pro-gressively approximating the economic
policies of member states, to promote throughout
the Community a harmonious development of
economic activities, a continuous and balanced
expansion, an increase in stability, and acceler-
ated raising of the standard of living and closer
relations between the States belonging to it.. . .
the activities of the Community shall include
(. . .) the abolition, as between member states, of
obstacles to freedom of movement for persons,
services and capital. Such freedom of movement
shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based
on nationality between workers of the member
states as regards employment, remuneration and
other conditions of work and employment’.
Articles 2–3, 48.2 Treaty establishing The
European Economic Community, 1957
When the European Economic Community
was founded in 1957, its purpose was a peaceful
and stable Europe, and the creation of a common
market was considered to be central to achieving
this aim. Mobile citizens were constituents of this
common market from the start, and to enable
mobility, the Community pledged to remove ob-
stacles workers might face.1 This was the theory.
In practice, it took a long time until more speciﬁc
rights were introduced, and until today, mobile
workers might well be penalised for moving
between countries.
This paper explores the mobility of social rights
in Europe from the perspective of pensions, amongCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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order not to be disadvantaged in comparison with
an immobile employee, a mobile worker needs to
be able to preserve their pension rights, otherwise
citizens who move risk losing their beneﬁts and
could face poverty in retirement. It is therefore
important to know how the broad guarantees
given by the European Communities in 1957 (EC)
look from this more detailed perspective.
Too little is known about the extent to which
transnational mobile workers are penalised in
comparison with immobile ones. The literature
has superﬁcially analysed the EU legislation of
public pensions and how the principles of deﬁned
beneﬁt occupational schemes hinder mobility but
has not investigated comparatively how the legis-
lation of national occupational pensions affects
mobile workers. Moreover, how well entitlements
accrued nationally are protected is not the only
criterion that decides whether migrants are
penalised by moving: differences in principles
and generosities of pension systems, and in
average wage levels between countries also have
an impact on migrants’ post-retirement income.
Although some work has been carried out on
these separate aspects of mobility, a more compre-
hensive, integrated approach is needed. This
paper begins this task. It investigates potential
hurdles to the freedom of movement created by
legislation, system generosity and wage differ-
ences. It assumes that a EU mobile worker would
need to answer three questions to assess their
freedom of movement within the EU.
(1) Is my mobility protected by legislation? This
question explores whether someone has the
legal right to add all public and private pen-
sion entitlement from different EU countries.
(2) Is the pension system of my host country
more or less generous than that of my home
country? Differing national principles and
levels of generosity will affect overall out-
comes and therefore the opportunity to move
permanently to another country.
(3) What is the average wage level of my home
country in relation to my host country?
Independent of system generosity, a pension
pot accrued in a poorer country with lower
wages might be too low to cover the higher
living expenses in a richer country, whereas
that accrued in a richer country might com-
fortably cover expenses in a poorer one.Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.The paper explores these questions on the
basis ﬁrstly of a review of the literature and
secondly, through an empirical investigation into
the impact of pension scheme generosity and
relative wage levels on the costs of mobility, an
issue that has received much less attention in
the literature. Our empirical research uses
illustrative examples from countries selected
according to the following criteria: ﬁrstly, we
were interested in countries that receive the
highest number of immigrants. We considered
that countries with a higher share of mobile
citizens, or with sudden inﬂuxes, are the most
likely to have developed pension legislation that
allows for mobility. Secondly, we deemed it
important that our sample include an eastern EU
country, poor compared with those in the west, so
that we capture countries with more and less gen-
erous pension entitlements and signiﬁcant
differences in wage levels. Thirdly, we wanted to
ensure that we could explore the impact of institu-
tional diversity and therefore selected countries
with different types of pension system.
The paper starts with an overview of the
mobility of EU citizens. It will show two main
streams of intra-EU migration since the collapse
of the Soviet bloc, one from northeast to
northwest and one from southeast to southwest.
This section is followed by an overview of EU
law regarding public and occupational pensions,
which assesses the protective value of this legis-
lation on the basis of a review of the available
literature. Finally, an empirical investigation
considers how the varying generosities and
principles of pension systems and differences in
the wealth of countries impact on mobile
workers.MOBILITY OF WORKERS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION2
Before 1989
After the Treaty of Rome was agreed in 1957, the
market for goods integrated much faster than the
labour market. Between 1960 and 1970, the inter-
EC trade in goods increased rapidly, from 34% of
all imports and exports of the six founding member
states to 48% and to 60% of all 12 members by 1990
(Tsoukalis, 1997: 19). During the same period, only
a small and in fact decreasing share of the EC
population was mobile within Europe. Indeed,Popul. Space Place 19, 714–726 (2013)
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the EC as a proportion of all EC trade increased by
0.8% per year, whereas the movement of workers
from one EC country to another as a proportion of
the total number of labour migrants in the EC
decreased by 1.3% per year (Straubhaar, 1988: 51).
The movement of workers with EC citizenship as a
share of all migrant workers in the EC fell from
around 60% at the beginning of the 1960s to 20% at
the beginning of the 1970s, and it remained at this
level until at least the late 1980s (Straubhaar,
1988:51). The intra EC labour market was
characterised by ‘free movement and little mobility’
(Tsoukalis, 1997: 117). Migration within Europe as a
share of the total population has been low in
absolute terms and in comparison with the United
States, Australia, Canada and Japan (Puhani, 2001:
129).
This relative immobility is not very surprising
if we consider the difﬁculties of a person who
moves away from the country he or she was born
in encounters: they leave behind their families
and friends, must use another language and they
have to live in a new cultural context. In the litera-
ture on migration, this is why it is assumed that
one common reason people become migrants is
that they are ‘pushed’ away from their countries
of origin. They move when the economic or politi-
cal problems in their home countries become so
strong that they prefer the upheaval of leaving to
the difﬁculties of staying. This is why before 1989,
main movements within the internal market took
place from south to north, that is, from the poorer
regions, southern Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, to
the richer countries (Tsoukalis, 1997: 118). Given
this situation, EC institutions and legislators could
afford to focusmuchmore on rules and regulations
for cheese, car tyres and other goods than on
removing the obstacles for persons. Furthermore,
the 1960s and early 1970s are generally regarded
as the ‘golden age’ of the welfare state, that is, as
a time when unprecedented economic growth
strengthened trade unions and enabled govern-
ments to expand their national welfare states.
This means member states focused on national
protection rather than EC mobility during that
time (Tsoukalis, 1997: 22).
After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, migration
began to increase, and in 2004, 15 years later the
now European Union was extended to include
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia,
Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. In 2007,Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Bulgaria and Romania joined. The economies of
Central and Eastern Europe were much poorer
than those of the long-standing members, even
if compared with the southern states of the
EU15, and as a consequence, migration from
these countries to western Europe increased rap-
idly, as we will show later.After 2000
By the turn of the century, a signiﬁcant number of
EU citizens were living within Europe but
outside their country of origin. Figure 1 shows
EU foreign-born immigrants resident within
different EU member states in 2000. The largest
numbers were in Germany, France, the UK, Italy
and Spain. In Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic
received the largest number, but most of these im-
migrants came from the Slovak Republic. Because
both countries were formerly part of Czechoslo-
vakia, this could be considered migration within
the same country. We therefore included Poland
in our sample instead, which recorded the next
highest number of immigrants. Of the selected
countries, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and
Poland represent the Bismarckian regime type,
characterised by fairly generous earnings-related
state beneﬁts that mirror labour market perfor-
mance. Only the UK is based on the Beveridgean
model, for which ﬂat-rate universal beneﬁts are
typical (see succeeding paragraphs for details of
regimes). In line with our aim to investigate
regime variation, we therefore added the Nether-
lands, another Beveridgean regime.
Between 2000 and 2009, the EU and EU+
OECD2 foreign populations3 in Spain, the UK,
Italy and the Netherlands increased (Table 1).
The increases were dramatic in Spain and Italy.
The data are unreliable or missing for France
and Poland, and in Germany, the EU foreign
population did not increase and may have
even declined. The small difference between
the size of the EU foreign populations and the
EU+OECD foreign populations shows that
migrants are mostly from within the EU with
the exception of Germany.4 Generally, the num-
ber of foreigners from within the EU increased
faster than the number from EU and OECD
countries combined. Thus, the proportion of
intra-EU migrants amongst resident foreigners
in these countries has increased. The UK is the
only potential exception.Popul. Space Place 19, 714–726 (2013)
DOI: 10.1002/psp
Table 1. Foreign nationality residents by country.
% pop of EU foreign
nationality (2009)
% pop of EU+OECD
foreign nationality
(2009)
% change of EU foreign
nationality pop 2000–
2009
% change of EU+OECD
foreign nationality pop 2000–
2009
Spain 4.96–5.11 5.43 329–464 302
UK 2.91–3.1 3.7 70–131 99
Germany 2.88–3.09 5.21 3 to 5 9
Italy 1.88–2.06 2.18 338–359 241
France 1.98–2.0111 2.51 0** ::
Netherlands 1.76–1.88 2.66 34–40 21
Poland 0.04 0.04 25–33*** 0****
Source: Eurostat, Population and Social Conditions, International Migration and Asylum and OECD, International Migration Database and Popula-
tion Statistics, own calculations. Where a range of values is shown, Eurostat and OECD data were used. ‘::’ represents missing data; *Size of popu-
lation in 2007, data incomplete; **Eurostat data only, % change 2003–2009; ***125 based on % change 2001–2009 (Eurostat), 133 based on % change
2002–2009 (OECD); ****% change 2002–2009 (OECD).
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Source: OECD, Database on immigrants in OECD countries, OECD 2000 census, own calculations. 
Figure 1. Foreign-born EU immigrants by country of residence, 2000 (thousands)
Source: OECD, Database on immigrants in OECD countries, OECD 2000 census, own calculations.
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main migration ﬂows into Spain, the UK, Italy
and the Netherlands are from Romania and
Poland (Table 2). In the north Polish, migrants have
moved to the UK and Germany; in the south,
Romanians have moved into Italy and Spain.
There are smaller, yet still signiﬁcant streams of
Polish migrants to the Netherlands. The pattern
of east to west migration in Europe has been
recognised (for example Black et al., 2010), but the
north/south divide has received less attention.
Our inclusion of Poland as host country has shown
that some, but comparatively fewer, move from aCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Popul. Space Place 19, 714–726 (2013
DOI: 10.1002/psprich to a poor country. Therefore, EU enlargement
has changed the patterns of migration, especially
Italy and Spain changed from emigration to
immigration countries. Migrants are young and
often highly educated, but they are signiﬁcantly
deskilled in low-wage jobs in the destination coun-
tries (see for example Alexandru, 2007; Ahonen
et al., 2009).
In summary, these data show that the social
rights connected with mobility have become rele-
vant for many EU citizens. The three questions
posed at the start of this paper about the protection
of such rights have thus become more salient.)
Table 2. Dominant nationality of inﬂow of migrants; EU foreign population per country.
Host country Reference year
Dominant nationality, EU
inward migrants Reference year
Dominant nationality,
EU foreign population
Spain 2009 Romanian 2009 Romanian
Italy 2007 Romanian 2009 Romanian
Germany 2008 Polish 2008 Italian*
UK 2005 Polish 2009 Polish
Netherlands 2009 Polish 2009 German
Poland 2009 German 2009 German
Sources: Eurostat, Population and Social Conditions, and OECD, International Migration Database based on data derived from own calculations.
‘Dominant’ nationality: the nationality constituting the largest proportion of inward migrants or foreign population. France is not included because of
a lack of reliable data. *This is the one exception to the north/south divide in migration.
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EU – LEGISLATION AND ITS LIMITATIONS
The ﬁrst question a migrant worker within the
EU needs to ask to assess the potential costs
of mobility is whether legislation protects their
social rights once they move. With regard to
pension rights, this legislation falls under two
types: EU law covers the mobility of public pen-
sions between member states; national legislation
covers the mobility of non-state pension rights.Statutory and Supplementary Pensions
The ﬁrst law about the portability of statutory
social security rights for mobile workers
(Regulation (EEC) 1408/71) only came into force
in 1971, 14 years after the Treaty of Rome.5 This
stipulates that a mobile worker should be treated
like a national in the member state in which he
or she chooses to work with the rules of only
one member state applying to this worker at
any one time. EU governments were aware that
national systems were based on the assumption
of lifelong membership and that mobile workers
might therefore be penalised, so they put in place
methods of calculations of beneﬁts to avoid such
effects. To establish an individual’s pension after
a pan-EU career, the pension administrators in
each member state in which a migrant has
worked have to make two calculations on their
behalf: ﬁrstly, they determine the individual’s
statutory entitlements only for the years worked
in this member state, using national legislation
(‘independent beneﬁt’.6) Secondly, to avoid a
situation in which mobile workers are penalised
by rules favouring long-term members, such asCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.a minimum period of insurance, national pension
administrators also work out the pension
entitlement of each mobile individual assuming
that they spent their whole working career in
this member state; on this basis, they apportion
the individual’s entitlement in relation to the
actual time spent in this particular member state
(‘pro-rata beneﬁt’). The individual will receive
whichever of these two amounts is higher. Once
beneﬁts are in payment, they are exportable
within the union, meaning a pensioner is free
to move.
European regulation of non-statutory supple-
mentary pension rights, that is, entitlements
acquired under compulsory or voluntary occupa-
tional or personal pension schemes7 are much
weaker, despite attempts by the EU since 2005 to
strengthen protections. Most importantly, the com-
pensation rules just described for state provision
do not exist for non-state pensions, and therefore,
the disadvantages created by short-term member-
ship are not compensated in the same way (Oliver,
2009). Instead, laws are restricted to the following.
First, workers who move to another country must
be treated the same as native workers by national
legislation for the time they spend in that country.
This affects for example the treatment of vested
pension rights (Directive 98/49/EC (29 June 1998)
Art. 4). Secondly, providers of supplementary
pension schemes must informmembers who move
to other member states about their rights (Art. 7).
Finally, after the worker’s retirement, providers
must pay the pension to another member state,
if required, net of taxes and transaction charges
(Art. 5).
On the basis of this legislation, how conﬁdent
can a mobile worker be they have the right toPopul. Space Place 19, 714–726 (2013)
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different EU countries? With regard to statutory
provision, most of the literature suggests that
mobile workers can be quite conﬁdent of adequate
protection. Many studies assume that the legisla-
tion described previously prevents losses on
account of mobility (Schmähl, 1993; Whiteford,
1996; Andrietti, 2001; Holzmann et al., 2005;
Kalogeropoulou, 2006; Forteza, 2010). However,
this claim has rarely been investigated empirically
(see alsoHolzmann and Koettl, 2011:49), andwhen
it has, problems have been identiﬁed (Wildasin,
1999; Fenge and von Weizsäcker, 2010). Where,
for example, pension entitlement is based on an
average annual amount using best years of
earnings, such as under the French system,
workers who move early in their career when their
earnings are normally lower are likely to be disad-
vantaged compared with non-mobile workers.
Problems can also be created by caps on pensions
orminimum income top-ups (for details, see Fenge
and von Weizsäcker, 2010).
The situation is even more problematic in the
non-state occupational sphere. It is well
known, for example, that deﬁned beneﬁt
schemes tend to penalise early leavers (Schmähl,
1993; Whiteford, 1996; Andrietti, 2001;
Kalogeropoulou, 2006), but these problems are
further complicated when mobility is cross-
national, because of the different regulatory
frameworks, scheme designs and terminologies
that exist between countries (Andrietti, 2001;
Forteza, 2010). Deﬁned contribution schemes are
more portable than deﬁned beneﬁt schemes
because after a vesting period, early leavers can
normally withdraw the actuarially fair value of
their pension funds (Andrietti, 2001). However,
even with these schemes, Whiteford (1996:
253–254) has identiﬁed circumstances under
which early leavers would be penalised. Moreover,
although deﬁned contribution pensions are more
portable, they are also less generous than deﬁned
beneﬁt schemes, thereby disadvantaging all workers
(Bridgen and Meyer, 2005).
In summary, one important problem of
pension right mobility, penalties for short-term
membership, has been addressed by EU legislation
for public pensions, but questions remain about
the scope of this protection. Moreover, reliance on
only one type of beneﬁt is rare in Europe; many
employees have additional non-state provision,
the protection of which depends on the quality ofCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.national legislation. This varies between countries,
creating unequal opportunities for workers from
different countries. In addition, by focusingmainly
on regulation, the literature has neglected two even
more fundamental issues for pension mobility
within the EU: the relative generosity of pension
schemes and the potential impact of large national
wealth variations on mobile workers. These topics
were less salient before EU enlargement, which
perhaps explains the neglect, but with increased
migration they can no longer be ignored. We turn
to them now.
PRINCIPLES OF BEVERIDGEAN AND
BISMARCKIAN PENSION REGIMES
The comparative literature on pension regimes
in Europe commonly divides EU countries into
Beveridgean and Bismarckian pension regimes
referring to public and non-state occupational
systems (e.g. Bonoli, 2003; Ebbinghaus et al.,
2011). A Beveridgean pension regime is
characterised by a broad base, normally a public
pension, which is universal and ﬂat rate. Everyone
or a very large share of the population is entitled to
it, including those on part-time work, low wages
and with family obligations, but beneﬁts are ﬁxed
at the same level for all. This level can be at or
above the poverty line to protect citizens from
hardship. Poverty preventing universal pensions
have long existed in most Beveridgean countries
of Europe: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland,
the Netherlands and Switzerland, which base the
public pension on citizenship. However, the level
can also be below the poverty line, which was the
case in the UK from 1945 to 2012 (Bridgen and
Meyer, 2011).
Universal, ﬂat-rate pensions are not sufﬁcient
for those on or above average incomes, no matter
whether their level is at or below the poverty line.
Higher earners expect to preserve their living
standard in retirement, and therefore, strong
occupational beneﬁts developed in Beveridgean
countries. These are income-related, and they in-
crease the replacement rates of pensions to
earnings in retirement. In most Beveridgean
countries, occupational schemes were deﬁned
beneﬁt schemes, but reforms since the mid-1990s
have changed them to career average or deﬁned
contribution schemes. The beneﬁts are still
income-related, but much less predictable for the
individual, because their ﬁnal outcome is nowPopul. Space Place 19, 714–726 (2013)
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pace of demographic change (Ebbinghaus and
Wib, 2011).
In all Beveridgean countries except Britain,
occupational pensions have been a mandatory
part of the pension regime, and coverage was
therefore high (Clasen et al., 2011: 292–3). In the
UK, voluntarism prevailed until 2012, and
therefore, this is the Beveridgean country with the
lowest occupational coverage, never more than
half of the working population in the private sector
(Bridgen and Meyer, 2011).
Bismarckian pension regimes are characterised
by earnings-related public contributions and
beneﬁts. Only those who have paid contributions
receive a public pension, and if the career has
been short or earnings low, for example because
of part-time work, pensions will be low as well.
Consequently, women are more vulnerable in a
Bismarckian system than men, even though in
most Bismarckian countries, care-related rights
have been introduced into the public system.
Because state pensions are generous for full-time
workers, occupational beneﬁts tend to be volun-
tary and are less developed in Bismarckian than
in Beveridgean countries. Germany, Austria,
France, Italy, Poland and Belgium are counted
among the Bismarckian regimes (Bonoli, 2003;
Clasen et al., 2011: 292).
The regime types are governed in differentways.
The Beveridgean universal ﬂat-rate pension is fully
public, administered, regulated and delivered by
the state; occupational pensions are normally
mandatory, but they might be administered and
delivered by employers or/and trade unions, or
other non-state institutions. In the Bismarckian
world, the full income-related pension is public,
that is, in contrast to the Beveridgean system,
there is only one tier governed by one set of rules.
This difference also makes the calculation of
mobile workers’ statutory rights less complex in
Bismarckian systems than in Beveridgean.
These systems emerged and evolved in national
contexts; they were shaped by national political in-
terests and reformed with citizens of nation states
in mind. In contrast, our research focuses on citi-
zens’ pension entitlements accrued under different
sets of national rules. By moving, a person might
therefore leave a Bismarckian system and move
to a Beveridgean one or the other way around.
They might also move between two countries be-
longing to the same type of pension regime.Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Considering these systems were not designed to
enhance such mobility, how do their principles
affect it?
MIGRATION BETWEEN BISMARCKIAN
AND BEVERIDGEAN REGIMES: GENEROSITY
AND PRINCIPLES
We have argued previously that mobility of
social rights is not only a question of applying
fairly the rules governing pensions in one country
to another but that we also need to take into
account the principles underlying national pension
regimes, affecting their generosity, and the compar-
ative wealth of countries. In fact, as the following
will show, generosity and wealth difference have
a signiﬁcant impact on citizens’ entitlements and
might well be more important for mobility than
the legislative protection of rights.
Table 3 compares generosity as determined
by the main principles governing Beveridgean
and Bismarckian regimes. To do this, we used
the net replacement rates of public and manda-
tory private pensions of hypothetical workers
after a full career under regulations valid in
2008 (OECD, 2011). With these replacement rates,
we determined the pensions of workers in seven
Bismarckian and six Beveridgean countries,
assuming they spent their entire career under
these pension regimes. We set these workers’ last
wage at 3000 (‘the manager’) and at 1500 Euro
(‘the assistant’) monthly.8 In fact, of course, real-
average wage levels differ across the EU, but by
using identical ones, we exclude the impact of
differing national wealth from our calculation.
This allows us to focus purely on the relative
generosity of the different systems. Secondly, we
wanted to assess how the average generosity of
the two regimes might affect the manager and
the assistant as mobile workers who migrate
between the systems. Given that migrants often
move when they are young, we assumed that
the workers would spend 10 years in one regime
and 35 in another.
Looking ﬁrst at the generosity of the regimes for
immobile workers, it emerges that higher earners
are treated similarly in both types. The Bismarckian
countries grant them an average replacement
rate of 60.9%, in comparison with 62% in the
Beveridgean countries, leading to an almost equal
pension in both systems. In contrast, lower earners
are much better off in the Beveridgean countries,Popul. Space Place 19, 714–726 (2013)
DOI: 10.1002/psp
Table 3. Average generosity of Bismarckian and Beveridgean regimes in 2008 (Euro).
Bismarck
manager
Beveridge
manager
Bismarck
assistant
Beveridge
assistant
Assumed gross monthly income at retirement 3000 3000 1500 1500
Average net replacement rate, full career (%) 60.9 62.0 68.3 86.2
Standard deviation in group 18.8 23.5 17.7 24.5
Lowest replacement rate in group 33.3 26.8 33.2 62
Monthly pension after 45 years in regime of 2008 1827 1860 1024 1292
Monthly pension after 10 years in regime of 2008 406 413 228 287
Monthly pension after 35 years in regime of 2008 1421 1447 797 1005
Beveridge monthly pension as % of Bismarck,
any length
102 126
Average monthly pension pension after 10 + 35 years in two regimes
Movement Bev to Bis Bis to Bev
Higher earner (2500 Euro) 1834 1853
Lower earner (1500 Euro) 1084 1233
Higher earner – % change in pension because of
movement
99 101
Lower earner – % change in pension because of
movement
84 120
Source: OECD 2001: 115, 121, 127. Bismarckian countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain. Beveridgean countries: Denmark,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Pensions are public and mandatory private beneﬁts.
721Free Movement? The Pensions of European Migrantswhere they would receive 86.2% of last wages as a
pension, about 24 percentage points more than in
the Bismarckian group. Accordingly, their average
pension in the Beveridgean is worth 20% more
than in the Bismarckian countries. This illustrates
the well-known higher degree of redistribution in
the Beveridgean system, because of the universal
ﬂat-rate pension.
In relation to mobility therefore, the lower
earner in Beveridgean countries would lose by
moving to a Bismarckian country, and also if they
moved from the more generous Beveridgean
countries, namely the Netherlands or Denmark, to
the least generous, the UK. By the same token,
low earners in Bismarckian countries would gain
by moving to a Beveridgean one. Although
variation in the Beveridgean group is higher than
in the Bismarckian (24.5 standard deviation Bev.,
17.7 Bis.), even the lowest replacement rate
for lower earners (62% in the UK) is about double
that of the lowest in the Bismarckian group (Po-
land). In contrast, for higher earners, the impact of
mobility between Beveridgean and Bismarckian
systems is less straightforward. Lowest replace-
ment rates are very low for both groups (33.3 Bis.,
26.8 Bev.) and outcomes vary substantially within
each. Whether a higher earner lost out by moving
would dependmore therefore on the relative gener-
osity of the particular national systems involved.Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Popul. Space Place 19, 714–726 (2013
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THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL WEALTH
Freedom of movement is not just determined
by different regime generosity but also by the
differences in countries’ wealth. For tables four,
ﬁve and six, we have calculated pensions for
immobile average-waged workers, using real
national average earning ﬁgures for full-time
workers in industry and services, all in Euro, and
the OECD net replacement rates of public and
mandatory private pensions of 2008 described
previously. The tables allow us to compare the
monthly national pensions and wages of these
workers with one another. The tables show enor-
mous wealth differences. For example, an immo-
bile worker in Poland would receive a wage
worth about 26% of an immobile worker in the
Netherlands and a pension worth about 9%,
whereas if a Dutch immobile worker decided to re-
tire in Poland, their pensionwould bemore than 10
times higher than that of a pensioner who spent
their career in Poland (Table 4). If we assume that
these different wage and pension levels reﬂect
different real costs of living, it is impossible for
pensioners from the poorer countries, Romania
and Poland to move to richer ones later in life.
This poses the question whether workers
can move at all, unless they start their career in)
Ta
bl
e
4.
T
he
im
pa
ct
of
w
ag
e
d
iff
er
en
ce
s:
m
on
th
ly
pu
bl
ic
an
d
m
an
d
at
or
y
pr
iv
at
e
pe
ns
io
ns
(E
ur
o)
of
m
ig
ra
nt
s
an
d
im
m
ob
ile
w
or
ke
rs
,r
eg
im
es
of
20
08
.
PL
N
L
PL
=
>
N
L
U
K
PL
=
>
U
K
G
er
PL
=
>
G
er
R
o
Sp
R
o
=
>
Sp
It
R
o
=
>
It
A
ve
ra
ge
gr
os
s
m
on
th
ly
ea
rn
in
gs
,i
n
in
d
us
tr
y
an
d
se
rv
ic
es
97
2
37
01
31
71
34
25
45
7
22
14
21
92
Pe
ns
io
n
af
te
r
45
ye
ar
s
32
3
36
94
11
86
19
18
23
5
18
80
15
71
Pe
ns
io
n
af
te
r
10
ye
ar
s
72
82
1
26
4
42
6
52
41
8
34
9
Pe
ns
io
n
af
te
r
35
ye
ar
s
25
1
28
73
92
2
14
92
18
3
14
62
12
22
Pe
ns
io
n
of
m
ig
ra
nt
af
te
r
45
ye
ar
s
29
45
99
4
15
63
15
14
12
75
So
ur
ce
:E
ur
os
ta
tA
ve
ra
ge
an
nu
al
gr
os
s
ea
rn
in
gs
.P
ol
an
d
:Z
lo
ty
tr
an
sf
er
re
d
in
to
E
U
R
O
,r
at
e:
14
Se
pt
em
be
r
20
08
_:
1
Z
lo
ty
=
0.
30
4
E
ur
o,
oa
nd
a
cu
rr
en
cy
co
nv
er
te
r,
w
w
w
.o
an
d
a.
co
m
.P
ol
an
d
an
d
It
al
y:
av
er
ag
e
ea
rn
in
gs
fr
om
O
E
C
D
20
11
:1
69
(2
00
8
ﬁ
gu
re
s)
.U
K
co
nt
ri
bu
ti
on
:a
ve
ra
ge
B
ev
er
id
ge
gr
ou
p,
U
K
so
ci
al
in
su
ra
nc
e
co
nt
ri
bu
ti
on
s
co
ve
r
pe
ns
io
ns
.R
om
an
ia
co
nt
ri
bu
ti
on
:p
en
si
on
s
ar
e
pa
rt
of
in
va
lid
it
y
co
nt
ri
-
bu
ti
on
s,
M
IS
SO
C
co
m
pa
ra
ti
ve
ta
bl
es
on
so
ci
al
pr
ot
ec
ti
on
.
[N
ot
e:
co
rr
ec
ti
on
ad
d
ed
on
26
Ju
ne
20
13
af
te
r
in
it
ia
lo
nl
in
e
pu
bl
ic
at
io
n
on
3
M
ay
20
13
.T
he
d
at
a
re
la
te
d
to
G
er
m
an
y
ha
ve
be
en
co
rr
ec
te
d
in
th
is
ve
rs
io
n
of
th
e
ar
ti
cl
e,
d
ue
to
an
in
it
ia
lt
ra
ns
cr
ip
ti
on
er
ro
r.
T
he
ch
an
ge
s
d
o
no
t
af
fe
ct
th
e
co
re
re
su
lt
s
of
th
e
ar
ti
cl
e.
]
722 T. Meyer, P. Bridgen and C. Andowa richer country. The tables also show the entitle-
ments of migrant workers who stay in their
country of origin for 10 years, earning national
average wages (in Euro) and who then spend
35 years of their career in their host country,
earning the average there. Again, we use the
OECD’s replacement rates to calculate the
monthly pension after 45 years and then work
out the proportion for 10 and for 35 years. As
we have shown previously, this is in line with
EU legislation for public pensions. We have
included the most common countries of origin
over the last decade, Romania and Poland, and
the most common host countries, Germany, the
UK, Italy and Spain. We also wanted to cover
two Beveridgean countries and therefore added
the Netherlands to the sample. We assume that
to speak of some degree of free movement for
workers within the common market, they should
be able to spend at least a quarter of their career
in their home country and still be able to retire
in their host country after a full working life. Is
this the case?
Firstly, if we measure the outcome by compar-
ing migrants’ and non-migrants’ pensions, the
migrants from poorer countries have a pension
worth 80–84% of that of an immobile worker in
the host country, regardless of whether this is
Spain, Italy, Germany, the UK or the Netherlands
(Table 5). Their home pensions are so low that
they count little overall. Migration therefore
disadvantages these workers compared with
immobile ones in the host country. By the same
token, they would be much richer than their
fellow countrymen if they returned to their coun-
try of origin to retire.
Secondly, we could also apply a relative
poverty line of 60% average wages of the host
country to see whether migrants on average
national wages in each country they work in
would be able to live a life without hardship in
their host country upon retirement (Table 6). This
appears to be possible for the Polish migrant to
the Netherlands, who would be 33% above the
Dutch poverty line; for the Romanian migrant to
Spain, 14% above; the Romanian migrant to Italy
would just miss this line. In contrast, the pensions
of Polish migrants to the UK would be worth
only just above half of this poverty line, and
76% if they went to Germany instead.
One could argue that the real test for whether
migrants are truly mobile is whether it is moreCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Popul. Space Place 19, 714–726 (2013)
DOI: 10.1002/psp
Table 5. Migrants’ public and mandatory private pensions (10 years in home, 35 years in host county) as per cent of
immobile workers and average wages (replacement rate).
Migrant
PL/NL of PL/UK of PL/Ger of Ro/Sp of Ro/Itof
NL PL UK PL Ger PL Sp Ro It Ro
Migrant’s pension as % of stationary
worker
80 912 84 308 82 485 81 644 81 542
Migrant’s pension as % of average
wage
80 303 31 102 46 161 68 331 58 279
Source: as in Table 4.
[Note: correction added on 26 June 2013 after initial online publication on 3 May 2013. The data related to Germany have been corrected in this version
of the article, due to an initial transcription error. The changes do not affect the core results of the article.]
Table 6. Public and mandatory private pensions of immobile and migrant workers on average and 50% average
wages in relation to poverty line (60% average wages).
PL PL =>NL PL =>UK PL =>Ger Ro Ro => Sp Ro => It
Average-waged worker’s pension 55 133 52 76 86 114 97
Half average-waged worker’s
pension
28 69 42 37 51 55 49
Source: as in Table 4. Migrants: 10 years in home and 35 years in host country. Migrants’ pensions calculated in relation to host country’s poverty line.
723Free Movement? The Pensions of European Migrantsdifﬁcult for them to receive a pension above
the poverty line in their host country than in
their country of origin. Therefore, thirdly, we
calculated whether migrants are better protected
against poverty when they retire abroad, after
10 years in their country of origin and 35 years
in their host country, than workers who stayed
in the country of origin (Table 6). Considering
the large wage differences, one would perhaps
have expected that the country of origin would
be more favourable in this regard. However, this
is not true. Surprisingly, all migrants on average
wages are at least as well protected against
poverty in their host country as they would have
been if they had remained immobile, with many
achieving a pension signiﬁcantly closer to the
poverty line than they would have if they
had stayed in their home country: this is true
for Polish migrants to the Netherlands and to
Germany, but also for Romanian migrants on av-
erage wages to Spain and Italy. The one exception
is the Pole going to the UK, whose pension in re-
lation to the poverty line would be 3 percentage
points higher in Poland (55%) than in Britain.
This is because the British state pension as a share
of the average wage was among the lowest in the
sample, 37.4% in 2008 (authors’ calculations,
table not shown, sources as Table 4); its propor-
tional reduction by 10 years for the migrantCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Popul. Space Place 19, 714–726 (2013
DOI: 10.1002/pspworker from Poland depressed the overall level
further, whereas the value of the entitlements
for contributions in Poland over 10 years was
too low to compensate for this loss. The Polish
state and compulsory pension was even lower
in relation to average wages (33%), but it did
not have to be reduced for the immobile Polish
worker, and therefore, the pension is slightly
closer to the poverty line than for the Polish
migrant retiring in Britain. However, the differ-
ence between the two relative pensions is small,
and both workers would retire to poverty with-
out additional voluntary provision; on this basis,
we conclude that for the Pole, remaining immo-
bile is as good or bad as migrating.9
Table six also shows the results for workers on
low wages, taking into account their higher
replacement rates in some countries. In this case,
all Polish migrants do better in their host country,
including the migrant to the UK, who beneﬁts
from the compensatory measures in the British
system for those on low income. The Romanians
do better in Spain and a little less well only in
Italy.
Our ﬁndings suggest that moving from poor to
rich countries does not disadvantage migrants
with a full employment career if they spend at
least 80% of this career in the richer ones. Indeed,
many achieve pensions higher than possible in)
724 T. Meyer, P. Bridgen and C. Andowtheir countries of origin. They are still disadvan-
taged in comparison with the immobile nationals
of their host country, but their chance to escape
poverty is better or as good in the host country
as it would have been at home. Of course, this
comparative advantage would gradually reduce
if a potential migrant stays longer in their poorer
host country before moving, because ﬁrstly,
replacement rates and principles of these systems
are less generous. Replacement rates in Romania
(51.5%)10 and Poland (33.2%) are lower than
anywhere else in the Bismarckian (64% average)
and Beveridgean group (67.5% average), with the
exception of the UK (37.4%). Secondly, signiﬁcant
differences in wage levels will not allow citizens
from the east to move and retire in the richer west,
unless they migrate early in their career.
THE BENEFITS OF MIGRATION
The aim of this paper was to explore how mobile
pensions are within the EU and whether workers
will be penalised for their mobility when they retire.
We have shown that EU legislation protects workers
moving between public pension systems to some
extent and that occupational pension rights are
regulated only at national level, exposing workers
to the distortions that affect early leavers of schemes.
For a long time, this deﬁciency mattered less in
practice, because relatively few EU citizens moved
between countries. However, the enlargement of
the EU has encouraged large numbers of migrants
to move from east to west, changing this situation.
Previous academic work on the portability of
social rights has examined the mobility of public
pensions (for example Schmähl, 1993; Whiteford,
1996; Holzmann et al., 2005; Kalogeropoulou,
2006) and how mobility affects occupational
pension outcomes (for example Andrietti, 2001;
Forteza, 2010); but it has been patchy from a
comparative perspective, covering only certain
countries and certain scheme types; in addition,
public and occupational rights have been analysed
independently of each other, leading to incomplete
assessments of their intertwined nature. Moreover,
consideration has focused on the impact of legisla-
tion on the preservation of pension rights, not on
the impact of movement between different types
of pension system and between nations of widely
differing levels ofwealth. Despite these limitations,
existing empirical studies largely agree that mobile
workers are disadvantaged in comparison withCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.immobile ones, even though EU legislation has
removed some disadvantages for public pensions.
This paper differs from the previous literature in
that it has sought to adopt a more comprehensive,
integrated assessment of pension mobility on the
basis of the argument that analysis of pension right
mobility must recognise that different system prin-
ciples and generosity as well as national wealth
differences are signiﬁcant for the relative position
ofmobile workers and that theymight in fact matter
more than portability legislation. On the basis of this
approach, our answer to the question of disadvan-
tage through mobility is more nuanced than that in
the literature. On the one hand, we agree that the
rules governing public and occupational systems
favour stability and sanction movement. Moreover,
this view is partially reinforced by our analysis of
movement between varying types of pension
systems, which shows that this can be a problem
for some workers. Thus, when keeping average
wage levels between countries constant, low-
income workers who move from a Beveridgean
system to a Bismarckian are vulnerable to a pension
loss. This is because of the greater level of redistribu-
tion in the former type. For this group of workers,
movement in this way is likely to incur a cost.
However, our ﬁndings also conﬂict with the
consensus view in the literature: when pension
system type and comparative wealth are included
in the analysis, some workers are not disadvan-
taged on retirement by mobility. Importantly, the
group for which this is most true – workers
moving from the poorer east to the richer west,
from Bismarckian systems of low generosity to
Beveridgean and more generous Bismarckian
systems – make up the majority of intra-EU
migrants today. Our research shows that these
workers are more likely to gain than to lose if
they spend at least 80% of their career in a western
host country, because of more generous regime
principles, expressed by higher replacement rates.
In addition, the fact that the western economies
are richer and pay much higher wages has a big
impact. Even incomplete participation in the
wealth of the more mature economies and welfare
states of the west leads to better protection against
poverty than staying in the less developed east.
Despite our insistence on a broader concept
when evaluating mobility, we still think that
better protection of occupational pension rights
for mobile workers should be a policy priority for
the EU Council. In most developed economies,Popul. Space Place 19, 714–726 (2013)
DOI: 10.1002/psp
725Free Movement? The Pensions of European Migrantsnon-state pensions are growing, and policymakers
want citizens to rely on them more. This shift
should be accompanied by legislative protection
mirroring that of public beneﬁts. At present,
reliance is placed on national protections about
which very little is known: information on how
EU member states deal with occupational rights
of mobile workers, that is, of early leavers or late
joiners of schemes is patchy and no inclusive over-
view exists. A comparative database on national
non-state pension regulation across the EU would
have to be established before broader assessments
of these protections could be made; but we are a
longway away from such a base, not least, because
in many countries, companies are not required to
publish details of their voluntary pension pack-
ages. Even though this might not matter as much
for many of today’s migrants, the stark wealth
differences between countries might erode over
the next two decades, making the improved
protection of occupational rights more relevant
for all. Besides, there are employees moving
between the richer nations today, and even though
they are in a minority, there is no reason why they
should be disadvantaged in comparison with
immobile workers.NOTES
(1) The Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community in 1957 focused on the establishment
of a common market and thus on the rights of
citizens as workers. This did not normally include
political rights and social rights only insofar as they
were directly related to employment. This focus on
the market has remained, even though the legisla-
tion needed for it has broadened over time.
(2) To assess the full political and administrative
pressures EU member states face through immi-
gration, we also included migration data from
developed industrialised democracies outside the
EU. Thus, we added to all EU 27 countries the
remaining OECD countries that are not EU mem-
ber states. We refer to the result as EU + OECD
countries. We excluded less developed non-EU
countries because these migrants are less likely
to acquire pension rights.
(3) We use data on foreign nationality when using
Eurostat and OECD ﬁgures on the size of the EU
foreign population as these data are more compre-
hensive than data on foreign-born.
(4) We attribute this to a large number of Turkish
citizens because second generation Turks born inCopyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Germany prior to 2000 were given Turkish citizen-
ship (Alba, 2005).
(5) Aminor amendmentwasmade in 2010 (Regulation
883/2004) but the regulation’s fundamental princi-
ples remain intact (Verschueren, 2009).
(6) Referred to as ‘theoretical amount’ in Regulation
1408/71, changed to ‘independent beneﬁt’ in Reg-
ulation 883/2004.
(7) The EU allows member states to voluntarily apply
the EU legislation in place for state pensions (i.e.
Reg. 883/2004) to their compulsory non-state
systems, but to our knowledge, only France has
yet asked for this legislation to be extended in this
way (OJ C135/17, 5.5.2011).
(8) These labels are only meant to illustrate easily wage
difference, they are not based on real earning
ﬁgures.
(9) In addition, the British public pension has been
reformed since 2008, leading to an increase in the
basic state pension; thus, from 2011, the Polish
full-time worker would be better off in the UK,
too (Bridgen and Meyer, 2011).
(10) Data from Romanian Labour Ministry, (www.
mmuncii.ro)
(11) We include under the term European Union (EU)
developments in the European Communities (EC),
the predecessor of the EU (1958–1992).REFERENCES
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